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This paper continues to investigate the role of human subjectivity and its delimiters in articulating 
the universe in physics and cosmology. As a case study, we reflect upon the complex of ideas of the 
so called Participatory universe by later J. A. Wheeler. The objective of the paper is to explicate the 
role of the human agency as a centre of disclosure and manifestation of the universe as well the as 
teleology of scientific representation of the world implied by the intrinsic purposiveness of human 
actions. 
Keywords: universe, participation, subject, observer, existence, purposiveness.
A metaphysical interpretation and understanding of the world is neither 
scientifically attainable nor scientifically excluded. It is another mode of 
cognitive approach to the world, a transition from the (as much as possible) 
neutral observation of the world to a personal relationship with the world. It 
is a product of the freedom of humankind, and therefore interpretation and 
understanding define its entire stance towards the world, its mode of use of 
the world.
Scientific observation does not simply affirm the reality of the cosmos; 
it constitutes it as an existential fact…, then every reality is recapitulated in 
the relationship of humanity with an active reason (logos) as an invitation-
to-relationship, which is directed towards humanity alone. 
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Introduction
In a recent paper (Nesteruk, 2012 [2]) the 
issue of delimiters in cosmological research 
which originate in the structure of the human 
knower was addressed, in particular, how the 
purposiveness of human actions cascades towards 
the purposiveness of cosmological research 
(Nesteruk, 2012[3]). The latter paper dealt with 
a “formal” purposiveness in cosmology related to 
the explicability of the universe. This explicability 
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is linked to the human intentional search for the 
sense of its own existence in the universe, so 
that the purpose of explanation in cosmology is 
related to the explication of the human condition. 
It was argued, in particular, that the theoretical 
representations of the “universe as a whole” 
and “the Big Bang” (as the encapsulated origin 
of the universe) act as the telos of cosmological 
explanation and, hence, as well, as the telos of 
anthropological explanation related to the origin 
of individual persons at birth (Nesteruk 2012[1]). 
In this paper we would like to discuss, as a case 
study, an interesting example of how scientific 
development in the 20th century led a famous 
physicist John Archibald Wheeler to extend the 
naturalistic methodology together with classical 
ideal of rationality (where subject and object are 
entirely separated and the world is supposed to 
pre-exist independently of human insight and its 
activity) towards that which can be described as 
a phenomenological stance portraying man as 
the centre of disclosure and manifestation of the 
world. It is of interest that this extension has some 
teleological connotations, bringing teleology 
into the heart of scientific explicability of the 
universe. 
Wheeler, after a long intellectual evolution 
working in physics, attempted to approach physical 
reality not as something “out there”, which is 
passively described by observers, but to see it as 
a genesis through conscious dialogue between 
observers-participants and physical reality, so 
that the universe emerges as a special articulation 
of the relationship between human intelligence 
and physical reality (Wheeler 1994 [1], p. 128). 
This approach, challenging the natural scientific 
attitude, was not appreciated by physicists who 
found Wheeler’s ideas “unpalatable in view of its 
rather mystical overtones” (Carr 1998, p. 158), and 
hence has not received any further attention and 
development. A sceptical reaction of physicists 
to Wheeler’s ideas can be understood because 
his ideas represent a metaphysical extension of 
physics which physicists do not consider as a 
part of their vocation and duty. However, seen 
historically and in particular in conjunction with 
philosophical developments in the 20th century, 
this was not an entirely arbitrary attempt for 
it manifested a certain inevitability of sliding 
towards a transcendental or phenomenological 
appropriation of physics if the latter were to be 
to tackle the issue of its own foundation and its 
very facticity. A simple question which must 
be posed by any physicist who is interested to 
know the truth would be this: why is physics 
possible at all? And here the question is not only 
about the intelligibility of the world, but rather 
of the very basic existential premises of physics 
related to humanity as its agent. Physics, as a 
science and social activity, is a product and a 
certain accomplishment of human beings who 
are themselves a part of the physical world. 
In this sense the facticity of physics is related 
to a particular position of human beings in 
the world, such that this world allows them to 
produce its own explication and description. On 
purely philosophical grounds, this explicability 
and description has an absolutely contingent 
character related, speaking in Heideggerian 
terms, to that fragment of the unconcealed being 
which is associated to a specific living presence, 
that is human persons. Still, for physicists, prone 
to reductionism, there remains a question as 
to whether physics itself can explicate its own 
existence, or, in a slightly different parlance, 
can some simple initial rules of interaction 
with the world (which, in fact, presuppose the 
world’s explicability from the beginning) lead 
with necessity to that picture of the world which 
we have here and now. In this sense the case of 
Wheeler’s thought (in spite of deviating from 
the established stream of physics) represents 
an example, in the history of scientific ideas, 
of how a naturalistic epistemology in science 
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in attempting to make a certain self-correction, 
through the search for its own facticity, leads to 
a transcendental problematic (remarkably with 
teleological overtones), that is to the view that 
the complete picture of physical reality must 
include the conditions of its explicability and 
constitution. 
Wheeler develops his own transcendental 
argument basing himself in Einstein’s theory 
of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics which, 
according to him, changed the vision of the 
human position in the universe by making 
human beings co-creators of physical reality 
in a very non trivial sense. He reformulates de 
facto the famous paradox of human subjectivity 
in the world1 which states, on the one hand, that 
humanity communicates some palpability and 
sense to the physical world, and, on the other 
hand, the fact that human incarnate subjectivity 
is a finite accomplishment of this world: 
“The brain is small. The universe is large. 
In what way, if any, is it, the observed, affected 
by man, the observer? Is the universe deprived of 
all meaningful existence in the absence of mind? 
Is it governed in its structure by the requirement 
that it gives birth to life and consciousness? Or 
is man merely an unimportant speck of dust in a 
remote corner of space? In brief, are life and mind 
irrelevant to the structure of the universe – or are 
they central to it?”(Wheeler 1975, p. 270).2 
Let us comment on this passage from the 
point of view of the already existing insights 
which came before Wheeler in philosophy and 
theology. 
“The brain is small. The universe is large.” 
Indeed the size of the physical organ, which is 
responsible for mental articulation of the whole 
universe, is incommensurable with the spatial 
size of the visible universe. Still, and this is an 
existential fact, it is from within this spatial scale 
that the articulation of microscopic realities of 
particles and fields, as well as huge astronomical 
formations is possible by this organ. There is 
something in this incommensurability, which is 
not physical, or, at least is not based on physical 
interactions. The very idea of a continuum of the 
universe as a single and united whole, although 
inaccessible to the empirical grasp, reflects a 
non-local and non-physical property of the world 
which is detected by consciousness through the 
power of intuition.3 
“In what way, if any, is it, the observed [the 
universe], affected by man, the observer? Is the 
universe deprived of all meaningful existence 
in the absence of mind?” Physics teaches us 
that, through our own spatial and temporal 
insignificance in the whole grandeur of the 
universe, we are just late newcomers into this 
world who only recently started to interfere 
with the physical environment on this planet. 
Our ability to affect the cosmos at large is only 
a matter of science fiction and some futuristic 
prophecies.4 However the question of Wheeler 
has another, much more serious dimension 
related to epistemology: will the universe as 
we observe it, that is see it in its particular 
contingent appearance as intricately related to 
our physiological and psychological constitution, 
be unconcealed to us in a different way, related 
to that measure, which man will be, in relation 
to that which can be unconcealed. Responding 
to the second half of a question formulated in 
the beginning of this paragraph, the question of 
the universe in absence of the human mind is 
an ontic question: indeed one can build, so to 
speak onto-cosmology (in analogy with onto-
theology criticized by Heidegger), in which the 
universe will be an impersonal being allegedly 
existing independently of the human grasp, to 
which one can attribute many intellectually 
imposed properties. The question then is what 
is the value of this universe for human beings. 
Rephrasing Heidegger, “can one dance and sing 
in front of such a universe”? (Heidegger 1969, 
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p. 72). The answer has been given long before by 
the proponents of theological insights, that the 
universe without human beings is dumb and it is 
humanity which is the “voice” (hypostasis) of the 
universe (See, for example, (Torrance 2001, p. 4), 
(Clément1976, p. 91)). The question of Wheeler is 
exactly about this: can one predicate the universe 
as existent without regarding humanity in measure 
of interaction with which this universe comes to 
its unconcelment? The development of physics in 
the 20th century with its increasing understanding 
that its results depend on the contexts which 
are not strictly objective and detached from us, 
but are set up by us through experiments and 
measurements, led Wheeler to an intuition that 
the mechanistically constructed representation 
of the universe remains no more than an idea, 
a mental accomplishment. Correspondingly 
the “meaningful existence of the universe in 
the absence of the mind” is a contradiction in 
terms, for the very word meaning has strictly 
human connotations (if we avoid any references 
to theology, which can suggest that the meaning 
of the universe originates in the creative and 
willing activity of the divine agency, which or 
who sustains this universe through creation out 
of nothing). In view of this, Wheeler attempts to 
address the issue of meaning: where the meaning 
comes from and whether it can come from some 
underlying physics, initially free from human 
insight.
Wheeler’s enquiry into the foundations of 
the historical contingent facticity of physics came 
to its explicit manifestation in his train of thought 
after a long period in his scientific activity when 
he was following a scientific programme of 
Einstein, who believed that it was possible to 
unify different physical forces reducing them 
to some geometrical effects. Wheeler spent a 
considerable effort to advance the so called 
“geometrodynamics” whose essence was also 
to explain the genesis of macroscopic space and 
time by appealing to some underlying structures 
which follow the rules of quantum physics 
(Wheeler 1968). Wheeler argued that space-time 
is a classical concept, an approximation, which 
is incompatible with the quantum principle 
(Wheeler 1973, p. 227). This meant to Wheeler 
that the basic ingredients of classical physical 
theories, such as space and time, cannot survive 
their extrapolation into the microscopic world 
where quantum principle rules, so that space 
and time are not basics and are subject to change 
and further explication. Generalising this 
observation Wheeler makes a much more radical 
conclusion about the mutability of physics, which 
implies that all classical physical concepts, 
while they loose their sense in the limiting case 
of microscopic scales, and, in particular, in a 
context of gravitational collapse predicted by 
general relativity, are subject to genesis from the 
realm which has no obvious and visual physical 
characteristics at all. In other words, physics 
which is usually associated with some immutable 
laws, constants of nature and harmonies in 
the world ceases to function in extreme cases 
such as gravitational collapse corresponding 
to the origin of the universe, so that, according 
to Wheeler, “there is no law except the law 
that there is no law” or “ultimate mutability is 
the central feature of physics” (Wheeler 1973, 
p. 242). One must reflect upon this last assertion 
with a grain of a philosophical scepticism, for the 
ultimate mutability of physics cannot serve as its 
transcendental delimiter: physics is impossible if 
mutability reigns in the universe simply because 
experience cannot then be ordered. Mutability 
excludes any identity in time for, according to 
Wheeler, there is no time, so that the mutability 
implies an infinite degree of differentiation 
in being, which cannot be stabilised even 
hypothetically in any reflecting thought. Still this 
mutability has a limit: the world of existences 
with human observers must be produced from 
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it and retrospectively constituted. Thus from the 
beginning the mutability affirmed has its limits 
originating in the counterfactual causality towards 
this mutability following from the actuality of 
the empirically present (and immutable to some 
extent) physical world. This causality is linked to 
the human agency which constitutes the world. 
And this human agency enters Wheeler’s scheme 
through the “quantum principle” by which he 
means an epistemological, as well as ontological 
claim originating in the extreme version of 
the so called Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum mechanics that quantum phenomenon 
is phenomenon as long as it is observed and 
articulated by some intelligible agency. This 
implies that what physics calls “nature” is not just 
something “out there”, in itself, but that which is 
constituted through the interaction of intelligible 
beings (who are capable of asking questions and 
receiving the responses) with that “something” 
which is initially inarticulate and which is being 
questioned. Wheeler writes: “Nothing is more 
astonishing about quantum mechanics than 
its allowing one to consider seriously the view 
that the universe would be nothing without 
observership as surely as a motor would be dead 
without electricity” (Wheeler 1994, p. 39). Then 
he comments on observership, referring to the 
views of Bohr and Wigner who advocated that 
observation and measurement are complete when 
they enter consciousness of an observer and 
then can be communicated to another observer 
in a plain language; “.. an experiment is only 
an experiment when the outcome is expressed 
in the form of communicable knowledge, 
knowledge which can be shared” (Wheeler 
1994[1], p. 26). But “observership” is not a 
simple term, it cannot be defined prior to the 
act of observation and establishing its meaning: 
“What is ‘observership’? It is too early to answer. 
[..] The main point here is to have a word that is 
not defined and never will be defined until that 
day when one sees much more clearly [..] how 
the observations of all the participators, past, 
present and future, join together to define what 
we call ‘reality’ ” (Wheeler 1994[1], p. 26). By 
employing a phenomenological language, reality, 
according to Wheeler, is defined as an intentional 
correlate of cumulative acts of observation and as 
a communal accomplishment along a particular, 
historically contingent, but, perhaps, teleologically 
driven ways. The meaning of reality can only be 
established if there is a field of intersubjectivity 
with some trans-empirical features, which 
transcend physical past, present and future. It is 
in the framework of this intersubjectivity through 
its continuous embodiment through observership-
participation that the truth and meaning of things 
is established. 
Being a physicist, Wheeler does not pretend 
to provide any sophisticated theory of how to 
derive the meaning of physical concepts such 
as space, time, particles etc. from a deep level 
of human subjectivity, that is the outline of their 
constitution. This is the work of phenomenologists 
who do not appeal to any vague physical analogies. 
Instead of this Wheeler traces the logic which is 
inherent in physical thought which makes the 
genesis of these concepts plausible through their 
consistency with each other. On the basis of this 
he conjectures that we enter now a “third era of 
physics”, which should explain the genesis of 
such concepts: “we have to account for all the 
structure that makes physics what it is” (Wheeler 
1983, p. 404).5 Wheleer believes that the question 
“What makes meaning?” applied to physics, is an 
existential question, for it also addresses the issue 
of the existence of human beings and the universe. 
But unlike existential philosophers, who were 
sceptical about science’s capacity to deal with this 
issue6, he believes that physics itself can address 
the issue of the facticity of existence: “Tomorrow, 
will it not be existence itself that comes under the 
purview of physics?” (Wheeler 1983, p. 404).
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The more radical, metaphysically oriented 
conclusion of Wheeler is that the overall reality, 
that is the totality of the world, is constituted 
through the interaction between the inarticulate 
“out there” with human intelligent agencies who 
create the network of questions and answers 
directed to and received from what they intend 
to call “reality”. It is interesting that this trend of 
Wheeler’s thought is similar to phenomenology 
which asserts nature, as articulated worldly reality, 
as having sense only in the context of the dialogue 
between human consciousness and that which is 
posited by consciousness. It is the dialogue with 
the unarticulated otherness of consciousness that 
ultimately reveals the meaning. J. Kockelmans, a 
philosopher and commentator of Husserl, writes 
with respect to this dialogue that the meaning of 
the world arises in the encounter between man 
and the world and “exists only in an interplay of 
question and answer. We find the question in the 
world but it is still implicit and vague. Through my 
reply, which itself is a question, the first question 
becomes sharper so that a more accurate answer 
becomes possible. Meaning arises in a dialectic 
relationship between man and the world, but it is 
not possible to say which of the two first begins 
the ‘interplay’ and which of the two first gives 
meaning to the other” (Kockelmans 1966, p. 53). 
This passage is strikingly similar to Wheeler’s 
ideas that physical reality reveals itself as an 
evolving complex of meanings in the course of the 
interplay between questions and answers which 
the human subject addresses to and receives from 
that “out there” which is eventually constituted 
by human observers as the physical reality and 
nature. Wheeler writes: “Physics gives light and 
pressure-tools to query and to communicate. 
Physics also gives chemistry and biology and, 
through them, observer-participators. They, by 
way of the devices they employ, the questions they 
ask, and the registrations they communicate… 
develop all they know or ever can know about 
the world” (Wheeler 1988, p. 5). Elsewhere 
he develops a simple analogy with a game of 
twenty questions which aims to recognise a word 
preconceived and hidden by a person through 
a simple process of interrogation of this person 
subjected to a single rule that it must be consistent 
with all previous questions and responses. In fact, 
if this word was not preconceived in advance, it 
will inevitably be constituted through the logic of 
the game simply because there must be answers 
“yes” or “no” which through a certain logic and 
questions’ content, constitute the sought word 
(Wheeler 1979). Similarly, he claims, in nature, by 
asking questions we initiate the process of nature’s 
response, which, in the course of enquiry leads 
us to the constitution of that which we intuitively 
aimed. Phenomenology described this process as 
a mental accomplishment of what is understood 
by nature: “nature”, which science aims at 
through idealization and mathematisation, is not 
something a-priori given to human observers and 
thinkers, but something which is constructed and 
evolved towards an indefinite telos. “Nature”, 
thus constructed, becomes exteriorised as an 
ideal (Gurwitsch 1974, p. 46) which is subject 
to accomplishment in a historical movement of 
scientific research because mathematics as human 
science is far from being static and accomplished,7 
and its advance creates more space for physicists 
to invade the realm of the yet unknown (although, 
perhaps, intelligible and invisible). In this sense, 
in analogy with phenomenology which makes a 
distinction between nature as it appears in primary 
perceptual experience (the inarticulate out there 
in Wheeler’s scheme) and nature-for-physicists 
(that is “nature” as constituted through questions 
and answers), which is a mental accomplishment, 
as an ideal limit of convergent sequences of 
“images of nature” which are constructed by 
physicists in the course of history, one should 
treat Wheeler’s genesis of meaning as an ever-
going mental completion of the concept of nature. 
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In the words of another phenomenologist, A. 
Gurwitsch, “nature” appears to be a “hypostasis 
of mental creations”8: this terminology resembles 
an old philosophical and theological notion of the 
so called en-hypostasization (personification, or 
human articulation) of nature or the universe.9 
Seen in this perspective, Wheeler’s treatment 
of physical reality through quantum and 
computational synthesis makes it clear that the 
notion of physical reality, nature, or the universe 
has sense only in the context of humanity, which 
is in a position to relate it to the commonalities 
of perceptual experience, that is to put it in the 
context of incarnate existence-in-situation, as 
well as recapitulate them through an intelligible 
representation. It is in this sense that one can 
suggest that all images of the mathematised nature 
manifest the presence of the immutable dualistic 
constitution of things in the world, namely a 
fundamental differentiation (Gr.: diaphora) 
between the empirical and intelligible. 
When we have pointed out that the 
construct of “physical nature” in Wheeler’s 
scheme represents an ideal, which can only 
be accomplished in the whole of the historical 
process, we assumed this as a philosophical 
hypothesis about hidden teleology in the scientific 
advance. Correspondingly, the progress of 
articulation of nature through its computational 
synthesis has meaning only as one particular 
tendency of the human spirit under which 
scientific knowledge and technology advance. 
The universe then is to be constructed along some 
particular path of knowledge corresponding to 
the human condition. Indeed Wheeler’s questions 
and answers create a particular way forward 
in bringing reality to unconcelament, the way 
which in its historical concreteness is contingent 
and non-generic. However, one must recognise 
together with a phenomenological critique of the 
mathematisation of nature10, that the universe 
constructed along the lines of Wheeler’s scheme 
represents characteristically the fragmentation of 
the primary existential link between humanity 
and the world, considered through a particular 
discursive function of the human intellect which 
is based on abstraction and idealisation. “Nature” 
in the thus understood scientific sense, being a 
particular human accomplishment, does not 
exhaust the totality of reality. On the one hand the 
constructed “nature” is exteriorised by human 
subjectivity and is intended as being devoid of 
its inward existence in the hypostasis of human 
beings, on the other hand the same “nature”, as 
being constructed, still entails some traces of its 
hypostatic origin. In different words, “nature” 
appears in a mode of intentional immanence 
related to those aspects of the overall reality 
which are not hypostatic in themselves, but en-
hypostasised by human obsrervers-participants. 
By taking de facto a phenomenological stance, 
Wheeler proclaims that the world is not a clock-
like machine which has been pre-constructed 
and then discovered by human observers; it is a 
self-synthesized system, coming into existence 
through the constitution of reality via questions 
and answers processed by a collective of persons-
observers who are capable of establishing the 
meaning and interpretation of their observation-
participancy ultimately leading to an integral 
view of nature. 
Participatory universe  
and human agency
As we mentioned above the main ambition 
of Wheeler’s concept is to approach the issue 
of genesis of “meaning” and hence “reality” 
of the universe in strictly physical terms. He 
attempts to explicate this genesis by employing 
as its primary elements observations and 
measurements as certain intentional acts of 
consciousness with respect to the world. The 
physical happenings which are assumed in a 
naively realistic view as taking place contingently 
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without being observed and measured, are 
contraposed to those events which were brought 
irreversibly into being by conscious intentions 
expressed through observations, so that the 
traces of presence of these intentions in being 
cannot be erased (Wheeler 1987, p. 311). These 
events can be called existential events because 
they involve human presence and it is in these 
events that the meaning of what is observed is 
established. The most difficult philosophical 
issue is exactly where and how this meaning 
comes from. Here Wheeler needs to give more 
precise definition of the human agency as that 
centre of disclosure and manifestation which 
provides this meaning. 
The human agency is portrayed by Wheeler 
as a network of observers, who by means of 
communication establish the meaning of what is 
called physical reality. Wheeler’s thought follows 
a kind of a reductionist emergent philosophy, by 
asserting that consciousness is a product of blind 
physical forces and myriads of particles in the 
universe. However, the reference to blind physical 
forces and chance prior to the established human 
articulation is made as a matter of rhetoric because 
the universe as the “world of existences” did not 
exist “prior” to human subjectivity: “observers 
are necessary to bring the universe into being.”11 
The universe thus is a participatory universe; 
its existence is relational upon the existence of 
intelligent observers whereas the existence of 
observers is being relational upon the ingredients 
of the universe. There is a certain reciprocity 
between the universe and observers: one cannot 
exist without the other (DeLaguna 1966, p. 82). 
As to the origin of reflecting and articulating 
consciousness in the universe, Wheeler sincerely 
believes that science will be able to provide an 
explanation of the origins of human intelligence 
in the future (Wheeler 1994[1], p. 307). This 
corresponds to his implicit desire to treat both 
intelligence as well as the intelligible image of 
the universe as emergent properties. The human 
phenomenon , then, would be an inevitable result 
grounded in purely natural factors, and the 
“tangible reality of the universe” would be just 
natural as well, although of a different, animated 
or self-reflected order. In one of his famous 
diagrams, illustrating the transition from the view 
of the dead mechanical universe to the universe 
as the world of existences, Wheeler represents 
the universe as a self-excited circuit, that is as 
developing through a cycle (closed loop) which 
excludes reference to any preexistent foundation 
outside this circuit (Wheeler 1994, p. 293) (see 
a more sophisticated diagram in, for example, 
(Wheeler 1988, p. 5)). In both diagrams the 
self-awareness of the universe through human 
intelligence, represented by Wheeler as the 
network of observers- participants, completes 
the “evolution” of the universe in Wheeler’s 
sense as the movement along the closed circuit. 
In fact, this so called “evolution” cannot be 
seriously treated as related to the objective pole 
in the universe, that is as physical or biological 
evolution as if it were devoid of the human 
insight. The “evolution” is itself a construction 
in the course of observer-participancy, whose 
completion is represented by the intelligent 
agency explicated by means of the same 
intelligence which is supposed to be a part of the 
diagram. Correspondingly there is no way out 
from this circuit, that is there is no foundation 
of the circuit outside itself. From a philosophical 
point of view this means that since the circuit is 
closed, and the universe receives its explanation 
from within it, no question on the purpose of the 
universe and its end can be posed in the sense 
of the material of the nexus finalis (that is, as 
if they existed in objects independently of the 
human intelligence): purpose and end are just 
the emergent attributes of the world of existences 
which pertain to the observer-participancy as 
human activity. The world’s existence and its 
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history according to humanity is explained from 
within its particular formation and, in reflection, 
results in a monistic view which does not require 
any appeal to trans-worldly factors. Wheeler 
argues that his model of a closed circuit escapes 
the danger of an infinite regress of causations 
towards the ultimate substance similar to that 
of the ancient Greek philosophy (Wheeler 1987, 
p. 313; 1994[1], p. 300). 12 
However it is not difficult to realise that the 
notion of underlying physical substance to which 
one can make an ultimate reference is replaced 
by the network (community) of human observers 
who “create” the physical world as constituted 
reality. 
In similarity with existential philosophy and 
theology Wheeler gives priority to human persons 
who produce meaning, rather than impersonal 
substance which is an abstract and impersonal 
notion. This entails a tacit anthropological 
assumption about embodiment, which is present 
in Wheeler’s theory of the universe, namely the 
constitution of intelligent hypostatic observers as 
unities of sensible bodies and soul which produce 
the coherent view of the universe: there is no 
explanation as to why this particular composite 
was brought into being. The logic of explanation 
is different, that is, the universe has a dual 
structure: as an undifferentiated stuff with no 
meaning (before observers developed) on the one 
hand, and as sensible agencies and objects with 
meaning on the other (or, in different words, as 
the sensible and intelligible) after the network of 
observers developed the intersubjective meaning 
of what was observed. This is the reason why the 
“observers are necessary to bring the universe 
into being”, that is, to transform something 
initially undifferentiated and non-articulated 
to things which are sensible and intelligible.13 
This implies, according to Wheeler’s logic 
that the intelligibility of the universe is rooted 
in the ability of human beings to establish its 
structures and patterns through communication, 
starting from some elementary observations-
measurements which are described by quantum 
theory. It is clear that the deposit of intelligibility 
has been tacitly present in Wheeler’s scheme of 
being from the very beginning. Human observers 
who explain the universe and their own place in 
it are already there even if the very scheme of 
being does not introduce them at a given stage 
yet. This also makes it clear that in spite of man’s 
“central” position in Wheeler’s meaning circuit 
it is not central enough, for the very existence 
of this circuit is possible because mankind can 
transcend its particular place in it and integrate 
the whole circuit in a single consciousness. 
This implies that while being a part of the 
meaning circuit human beings transcend it in 
the sense that they have an a-priori ability to 
contemplate the universe as a whole and position 
themselves in it before they consciously account 
for their position through the abovementioned 
diagram. In other words, there is an inherent 
consubstantiality between human observers and 
the universe which is not articulated at the initial 
parts of Wheeler’s scheme, but which is tacitly 
present through the very possibility of depicting 
those parts of physical reality which have not yet 
produced humanity. But this consubstantiality 
has, so to speak, a transcendental character; for it 
is detected by human consciousness through the 
next order of reflection. In this humanity exhibits 
itself as metaphysically infinite creatures, living 
in the conditions of a physical finitude, the finitude 
which is constituted by humanity itself from the 
perspective of the infinite. 
Here the analogy with transcendental 
philosophy can be invoked. Indeed, if Wheeler 
claims that the observers bring the universe into 
being, including its space, time, etc. (Wheeler 
1988), then one can reasonably ask: where do 
human observers do this from, if there is no 
preexistent space and time? This question is 
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reminiscent of the famous Kantian affirmation 
that human being is phenomenon and noumenon 
at the same time. On the one hand human beings 
as biological organisms are in space and time. On 
the other hand, according to Kant, space and time 
represent transcendental forms of sensibility as 
the necessary conditions for human perception 
of the physical bodies. This means that because 
human beings constitute space and time from 
the depths of their transcendental ego which 
is eidetically “prior” to any particular form of 
physical embodiment, one can conjecture that 
they inhere in “something” which is beyond and 
prior to space and time and which, at the same 
time, contains in itself the potentiality of being 
explicated in terms of space and time. 
Wheeler attempts to claim that the 
meaning of space and time, as well as all 
other attributes of the universe, is constructed 
through observership-participation in acts of 
cognition resembling quantum measurements. 
A philosopher, in the style of Kant, would object 
to this by saying that the sense-data alone can 
not constitute the notions of space and time and 
that, vice versa, the ordering of the sense-data 
can only be done in rubrics of space and time 
which are a-priori forms of sensibility. Whereas 
a phenomenological stance would be that space 
is not pre-existent and objective “out there”, 
originating from subject’s passive contemplation 
of it, but in terms of subject’s comportment “in” 
it. This, so called, attuned space becomes an 
initial instant and a medium of disclosure of that 
“objective” space through relation to which this 
subject is constituted as a corporeal existent in 
space. However, this relationship is manifest of 
a paradox similar to that of the container and of 
the contained put in an interrogative form: how 
can one grasp the relationship of a particular 
being (subject) as if ‘in’ space when this being 
is essentially constituted by being ‘over against’, 
and hence beyond space? (Ströker 1965, p. 15). 
This once again brings us to the Kantian stance 
on human being, as being simultaneously 
phenomenon and noumenon: on the one hand 
space is an a-priori form of sensibility which 
allows a subject to order its experience; on the 
other hand this form of sensibility is unfolded not 
from within that space which is depicted by it, 
that is it comes from beyond any possible spatial 
presentation of experience. 
What is obvious, however, is that the 
constitution of space, first of all of the attuned 
space, is intertwined and not detachable from the 
fundamental aspect of human embodiment or 
corporeity. Embodiment or corporeity manifests 
itself not as a system of some biological processes 
nor as simply a body animated by the soul, nor 
even a simple unity of both of them. It is not also a 
lived body (corps-sujet in a sense of G. Marcel); it 
is a living being in relation to other beings and to 
the world, in whom this relation is announced and 
articulated by the way of its sense-reaction and 
its comportment, or its action in situation. In this 
sense the constitution of space in all its varieties 
(from attuned space of immediate indwelling to 
mathematical space of the universe) represents 
the modes of explication of embodiment or 
corporeity of humanity through which it interacts 
with the world. Thus the lived body entails a 
kind of lived space which bears the character 
of self-givenness “in the flesh”. In other words, 
the initial point of any discourse on corporeity 
and associated spatiality implies knowledge as 
presence “in person” or “in the flesh” as a mode 
of givenness of an object in its standing in front 
of the functioning corporeity.
The question of embodiment becomes 
acutely important in Wheeler’s scheme of origin 
of the universe as the world of existences. 
Indeed, what is important is that the network 
of observers is the community of embodied 
creatures, and this embodiment per se reflects 
the pre-existing physical conditions which are 
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not subject to considerable change during the 
span of the human civilisation. In other words, 
one can assume together with Wheeler that 
these conditions of embodiment as statements 
of physics have not been always articulated, 
but they have been implied, so that any physics 
which follows from a cognitive acquisition of 
the world is prone to contain the conditions of 
embodiment as transcendental conditions for 
the explicability of nature. It is in this sense that 
the famous Weak Anthropic Principle (Weak 
AP) can be taken into account: what we observe 
may be restricted by the conditions necessary for 
our embodied existence as observers. Then the 
unfolding process of Wheeler’s articulation of 
the world contains in itself the very possibility of 
existence of those creatures who articulate this 
world. In spite of a contingent path of articulation 
of nature, which is related to the history of the 
sciences, this contingency contains an element 
of necessity: this articulation and constitution 
takes place only in relation to that bulk of being 
which is unconcelad through the conditions of 
embodiment. The famous thesis of Protagoras 
that man is the measure of all things, seen 
through the eyes of Heidegger (Heidegger 1987, 
p.91-95), gives strength to our assertion that the 
constitution of reality according to Wheeler, 
being an open-ended process, is still human-
centred because the very explicability of the 
world through the chain of questions and answers 
is subjected to the condition of its origination in 
embodiment. It is important to realise that neither 
the Weak AP, nor the participatory genesis of 
Wheeler make an explicit link of the limits of 
embodiment expressed in physical terms to 
the limits of cognitive methods of exploration 
of reality (as was famously proposed by Kant 
through reference to Euclidian Geometry and 
Newtonian physics). In terms of exploration 
of physical reality one can either gain access 
to processes beyond the scales of embodiment 
through technology, or even transport the very 
conditions of embodiment on spaceships to 
some hostile terrain in order to gain knowledge 
of that which is beyond the Earthly horizon 
of embodiment. In this sense the Weak AP or 
the Participatory strategy of Wheeler state 
nothing of the restrictions on the methodology 
of research, or in different words, they avoid 
any commitments to the limits of possible 
knowledge in the sense of its methods. In this 
sense they both are more flexible in comparison 
with the Kantian dogmatic position. However 
the Kantianism remains in both Weak AP and 
Participatory AP in a hidden and more subtle way 
through the implicit teleology which pertains to 
the very way nature becomes unconcealed and 
explicable in the conditions of embodiment.
In order to make the ambivalent position of 
the human observer (noumenon/phenomenon) 
more explicit, one might place our discussion 
back in the Kantian frame of mind. Space and 
time as being constituted by intelligible observers 
in Wheeler’s scheme of things can be said as 
being brought into being by transcendental 
observers whose existential centre relates to the 
physical world but is not exhausted by it. In this 
sense the genesis of reality, or its constitution as 
articulated in consciousness, appeals to the realm 
of the intelligible. Space and time as articulated 
notions, as well as the whole universe appear as 
mental images of reality, as ideas which have a 
precarious relation to physical reality. By learning 
the lessons from Kant, it can then be anticipated 
that any attempt to provide a coherent picture of 
the ‘genesis’ of the concept of the universe, that 
is to speculate about its ultimate grounds on the 
physical level, will inevitably lead reason to an 
antinomian difficulty. This consequently places 
the notion of the community of observers which 
gives meaning to the universe in an ambivalent 
position of being in the world, and at the same 
time not of the world. 
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Indeed, one can conjecture that the thesis 
of Wheeler’s Participatory AP, namely that 
“observers are necessary in order to bring the 
universe into being”, makes the notion of the 
network of observers in Wheeler’s concept similar 
to the idea of an absolutely necessary being that 
appears in the fourth Kantian antinomy so that 
Wheeler’s proposition can be reformulated as 
a participatory anthropic antinomy (See also 
(Nesteruk 1999, p. 83; 2003, p. 225)):
Thesis: The network of intelligent observers 
understood in a transcendental sense as existing in 
whatever relation to time and space is absolutely 
necessary for the visible universe in space and 
time to be brought into being.
Antithesis: The existence of the visible 
universe with spatiotemporal attributes is not 
contingent upon the existence of the network 
of intelligent observers (understood in a 
transcendental sense) as its cause either in the 
visible universe or out of it.
This antinomy indicates the dichotomy in 
the ontological status of the network of intelligent 
observers as having a specific location of their 
embodiment related to the physical conditions of 
survival and, at the same time, as transcending 
these specific places and establishing the 
sense of space and time out of some originary 
propensities that define the observers as 
intelligible and consciously non-local beings. 
This seeming paradox, which represents a 
particular reincarnation of the paradox of human 
subjectivity mentioned above, contributes to the 
constitution of human observers as composites of 
the corporeal and intelligible whose contingent 
facticity cannot be accounted for, remaining thus 
a primary metaphysical mystery. This cascades up 
to the mystery of the universe as the constituted 
World of Existences: since the origin of human 
personhood can hardly to be reduced to the results 
of impersonal chances and necessities in physical 
factors and causality, its presence in the universe 
can be treated as an event which can be called the 
humankind-event (Nesteruk 2003, pp. 194-200). 
This event is indeed formative for the universe to 
exist, that is to be manifest and disclosed in human 
personhood. Then the process of constitution of 
the universe in Wheeler’s participatory scheme 
reveals itself as the enhypostasization of the 
universe within the humankind-event, that is 
the universe itself becomes no more than an 
event related to the history of humanity, a flash 
of the universe’s self-consciousness depicted in 
Wheeler’s writings by a diagram of the human 
eye emerging in the bold letter U (symbolising 
the universe) which itself is the formation of this 
eye (Wheeler 1994, p. 293).
Some other philosophers formulated a 
similar “eventiality” of the universe by referring 
to a communal character of events of knowing. 
In P. Heelan’s terms, “the phenomenon takes 
‘flesh’ in the world differently because its ‘flesh’ 
is determined only as a consequence of decisions 
taken by local and historical communities of 
expert witnesses”(Heelan 1992, p. 58).14 It is 
in this sense that the articulation of the past of 
the universe is an event within the life-world 
of a particular community loaded with a sense 
of the community’s lived past and of decisions 
to be made in the future. As Heelan points out, 
“it is not the case that every historical event is 
also an event of a scientific kind…, but when the 
local community is one of expert witnesses, then 
the scientific data produced by that community 
are also historical events in relation to that 
community” (Heelan 1992, p. 66). H. Margenau 
argued in a similar way that “physical reality” is 
best defined as the totality of all valid constructs. 
In this approach the universe is defined not as a 
static, but as a dynamic formation: “…the universe 
grows as valid constructs are being discovered. 
Physical entities do not exist in a stagnant and 
immutable sense but are constantly coming into 
being” (Margenau 1944, p. 278).15 
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Wheeler, as well as the others, attempts to 
make a point that the sense of physical reality 
is not a pregiven compendium of laws and 
facts and that it originates in the constitution 
of this reality through formation of meaning 
of the universe through communication in the 
network of observers. Wheeler does not give any 
specific model of how to deduce the meaning 
from the forms of intersubjectivity, but his 
“reconstruction” of logical steps involved in 
making physical theories articulates the fact that 
in spite of the idealisation and mathematization 
with which modern physics operates, there is 
still a level of understanding which itself cannot 
be described through them. In other words, 
physics cannot account for its own facticity only 
through physics itself: one needs to appeal to 
such an order of reality by reference to which 
physics at least receives its interpretation. This 
implicitly points out to the mundane fact that the 
scientific advance, despite its complex language, 
is ultimately rooted in the primary experience of 
the world, in that which phenomenology calls the 
life-world.16 This implies that the sphere of human 
subjectivity as immediately given and irreducible 
to any scientific analysis is assumed by Wheeler 
to be present in order to develop from within it 
the articulated picture of the world with a special 
language and mathematics. Wheeler’s conjecture 
that the whole edifice of modern physics can be 
reduced to a simple quantum principle, “it is from 
bit” (Wheeler 1994, p. 295), shows that there is 
still a certain level of reality behind these “bits”, 
which constitutes the meaning of any sequence 
of those bits and this reality is the mystery of 
embodied human consciousness which endows 
reality with meaning. However, the observers 
who possess the ability to articulate the external 
world, are incapable of comprehending the very 
possibility of acts of consciousness which are 
responsible for the articulation of the world. Can 
physics explain them in naturalistic terms? In 
spite of a heroic attempt of Wheeler to propose 
a scheme for elucidating this problem, his 
intellectual construction of the participatory 
universe demonstrated with a new force that the 
main philosophical mystery of human intentional 
consciousness and its engagement with the world 
still remains (Cf. Marcel 1965, p. 24). 
In spite of a philosophical scepticism 
with respect to Wheeler’s attempts to give a 
physicalistic model for the genesis of meaning 
of the universe as a process of mutual interaction 
between the network of observers and their 
physical environment one should admit that 
they contributed in a non-obvious way to the 
rearticulation of the life-world as that primary 
existential milieu which lies in the foundation 
of scientific articulatiuons of reality. The search 
for the foundations of the universe, as well as 
the foundations of physics leads inevitably to 
the recognition of the centrality of existential 
“immediate here” and “immediate now” from 
which the whole grandeur of the universe (as 
the world of existences) comes into existence 
by “contracting its existing” in life of human 
observers (Cf. (Levinas 1978, pp. 82-85; 1987, 
pp. 42-44). This confirms a general philosophical 
conviction that science contributes to the 
understanding of life and humanity, for “the 
whole universe of science is built upon the 
world as directly experienced, and if we want 
to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and 
arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning 
and scope, we must begin by reawakening the 
basic experience of the world of which science 
is the second-order expression” (Merleau-Ponty 
1962, p. ix (emphasis added)). That which was 
formulated by M. Merleau-Ponty in the context 
of existential philosophy has been renewed in 
Wheeler’s metaphysical extension of physics: 
namely to remind physicists that all their notions 
are ultimately inherent in the very specific place 
human beings occupy in the world which they 
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attempt to articulate. However, the nature of 
human subjectivity and intersubjectivity, for 
obvious philosophical reasons17, did not enter as a 
constitutive principle of physical explanation. The 
mystery of human intelligence was recognised as 
pivotal for developing an articulated picture of the 
world, but, at the same time consciousness and 
intelligence were treated in a reductionist sense 
as products of physical and biological evolution. 
If Wheeler’s model of the participatory universe 
is assessed through the eyes of an existential 
stance on the primacy of the sphere of human 
subjectivity, expressed, for example, in the words 
of Merleau-Ponty, quoted above, then obviously 
the universe as a self-exited circuit must require 
for its ontological assessment one crucial element: 
the presence of conscious insight overlooking this 
universe from above and beyond. 
In order to make the latter thought clear, one 
can suggest a graphical interpretation of three 
typical cosmological diagrams which pretend 
to catch the unity of physical reality at different 
spatial scales and other physical parameters. 
Indeed at the figure in the Appendix we have three 
different representations of such a unity: in the 
upper left corner there is an image of the so called 
Uroboros, symbolising the interconnectedness 
of physical entities at different spatial scales of 
the universe (Primack 2006, p. 160). Humanity’s 
consubstantiality with the universe is depicted at 
the bottom centre of this diagram. In the second 
diagram, below, there is a display of various 
objects in the universe according to their sizes 
and masses (Barrow 1999, p. 32). Once again 
humanity is positioned as a mediocre physical 
formation at the centre of this diagram. Both 
these diagrams are presented as static formations 
which do not reflect any processes or genesis 
of these diagrams, that is their epistemological 
constitution. Correspondingly, any attempt 
to predicate on their basis that humanity is 
physically insignificant in the universe will be 
philosophically weak because both diagrams 
are mental creations and humanity is present in 
them not only through its insignificant position 
but above and beyond all its elements as an 
articulating consciousness. This is depicted 
by positioning the human subject outside the 
diagrams while retaining the traces of its physical 
embodiment. If now one compares the Uroboros 
and the size/mass diagram with Wheeler’s 
graphical representations of the participatory 
universe (the right-hand side of the same figure) 
presented through a genesis of physical properties 
of the world towards its intelligibility (Wheeler 
1988, p. 5), then the difference is clearly seen: 
the diagram attempts to encapsulate a temporal 
aspect in formation of the overall picture of the 
universe and make manifest that the universe 
is an accomplishment because the human 
phenomenon in it is itself an accomplishment. 
However the presence of human beings as 
forms of biological life does not entail with any 
physical necessity the presence of intelligence. 
Correspondingly the diagram of the closed-
circuit universe is not just an accomplishment of 
physics, it is a mental accomplishment which is 
contingent upon intelligence, which is, through 
embodiment, a part of the diagram and, at the 
same time, something outside of it. In other 
words Wheeler’s diagram presupposes for its 
own existence the presence of intelligence which 
creates this diagram: humanity appears in it as 
the centre of disclosure and manifestation. The 
physical genesis depicted in this diagram requires 
a reflecting consciousness which has propensities 
which do not simply follow from the chain of 
physical causations. In this sense the genesis of 
physical properties leading to the fulfilment of 
the necessary conditions for observer’s existence 
does not entail the fulfilment of the sufficient 
conditions which justify intelligence and the 
way this intelligence approaches reality through 
the logic of questions and answers suggested by 
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Wheeler. Once again, what is missing in Wheeler’s 
diagram is the presence of the subject for whom 
this diagram makes sense. And this subject is 
above and beyond this diagram (depicted at the 
centre), in that directly experienced world, given 
to humanity in its embodied consubstantial 
constitution so that the diagram itself, phrasing 
this in the language of Merleau-Ponty, is the 
second-order expression of this world.
From a philosophical point of view there 
is a gap in Wheeler’s reasoning on the universe 
as an emergent meaning circuit, for there is no 
explanation as to why the intelligent observers, 
who reveal the intelligibility of the entire 
universe, are possible at all. In other words, why 
the universe entails the transcendental conditions 
of its own explicability. Here Wheeler invokes a 
kind of a theological reference by affirming that 
the whole situation in modern science completely 
changed the problem of creation as the problem 
of the relationship between man and God. If in 
the traditional theology human observers were 
treated as created by God in his image and thus 
having an innate ability to articulate the whole 
creation, in contemporary science these observers 
are treated as a result of the natural development 
of the world, so that the articulation of the world 
is part of the ongoing process of development of 
humankind. To accentuate this contrast Wheeler 
in one of his texts refers to an old legend of the 
dialogue between Abraham and God (which 
manifested the relationship between man and 
God) and says that “in our time the participants of 
the dialogue changed. They are the universe and 
man” (Wheeler 1994, p. 128). In the same passage 
he imitates the dialogue between the universe 
and man as an act of personifying the universe 
through the sequence of questions and answers. 
The universe acquires a sort of “intelligibility” as 
its “natural artefact”. 
In conclusion, the main interesting result 
of Wheeler’s attempts to sketch the “physics of 
meaning” was the rediscovery of the issues of 
the life-world. Physics has sense as long as it 
has meaning, which was assigned to it by human 
beings. This means that physics is essentially 
human, as well as the universe constructed 
through physics, and represents an intentional 
correlate of human intersubjectivity, so that it is 
given to us in so far as it contains us. The world 
of classical physics which was deprived of its 
inward existence in subjectivity, receives back 
its existential meaning through the metaphysical 
extension of some propositions of quantum 
physics. In spite of the fact that there is no direct 
reference to the Divine as the ultimate source 
of human intelligibility in the world, there is a 
reference to the otherness of the world which is 
implicitly made in Wheeler’s models through 
posing a fundamental question of meaning: why 
is the universe? 
Implicit Purposiveness  
in Wheeler’s Participatory Universe 
Finally we want to discuss a teleological aspect 
of Wheeler’s thought. For the universe to become 
the World of Existence this same universe must 
have conditions for the emergence of intelligent 
life and thus its explicability. Correspondingly 
if the World of Existences, as it seems from 
Wheeler’s writings, is that high term in the overall 
chain of transformations in the universe, so to 
speak its “ontic” goal, then the presence of the 
human intelligence in the universe is somehow 
implanted into this goal. When the Participatory 
AP asserts that observers are necessary for the 
universe to come into being it effectively states 
that the development of the universe must have a 
necessary condition for the emergence of human 
beings. Here one can ask a question as to whether 
there is an implied teleology in Wheeler’s view 
of the universe, where teleology is referred to 
a definite material pole, that is to that physical 
state of the universe when human life is possible. 
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Probably one must give a negative answer to 
this question because the necessary conditions 
for emergence of biological life in the universe 
do not automatically guarantee the emergence 
of intelligence. The sufficient conditions for 
the emergence of intelligence in the universe 
are not subject to the physical description. 
Correspondingly the seeming teleology of 
Wheeler’s account for the genesis of the World 
of Existences is not related to the material 
goal of the universe’s development; it rather 
relates to another teleology, associated with the 
explicability of the universe by human agency. 
In fact, in Wheeler’s case, this explicability 
is closely connected with the constitution of 
meaning of the universe: to constitute the 
universe as the World of Existences one must 
establish the meaning of things in this universe. 
Thus the whole pattern of Wheeler’s reasoning 
when he invokes an analogy with the quantum 
questions and answers points not to the material 
pole, or a result of its constitution (for it seems 
to be an open-ended process) but rather to the 
strategy or methodology of the scientific quest 
for meaning of the universe, a particular way of 
interrogation of nature and its outcome delimited 
by this way (See (Nesteruk 2012 [3] ). The 
objective of physics is to explain the universe; 
the telos of this explanation is not something 
which pre-exists this explanation, but that 
remote epistemological ideal, a supposed mental 
accomplishment, which would correspond to an 
imagined convergence of different strategies of 
explanation and correspondence rules. In spite of 
a principal impossibility of stating even roughly 
the possible ideal pole of such an explanation, 
there is one teleological example which makes it 
possible to elucidate the sense of what Wheeler 
implied in his idea of the Participatory universe. 
This example relates to the Big Bang, the 
ultimate beginning and origin of all things in the 
universe, including human intelligence itself. 
The notion of the Big Bang was at the 
centre of Wheeler’s discussions on the nature of 
space and time as that epistemological boundary 
beyond which physics cannot proceed. He also 
drew the conclusion that since the notions of 
space and time loose their physical meaning in 
the singularity of the Big Bang, they must be 
considered mutable ingredients of physics subject 
to constitution. Correspondingly the Big Bang 
itself is not an immutable material pole associated 
with the origin and beginning of all things, but 
a construction whose anomalous properties point 
not so much to the limiting capacities of physicists 
to deal with the questions of origin, but rather to a 
specific way in the acquisition of reality (through 
the logic of questions and answers) which leads 
to the constitution of what is meant by the Big 
Bang. It is remarkable, however, that the process 
of constitution of the universe, as being directed 
in the future of the historical time associated with 
observers, encompasses all temporal aeons of the 
universe, including its allegedly existing past. This 
means that not only our actual present is subject 
to constitution, but what is aimed to be the past 
and future of the universe is constituted by the 
human observers and thus their ontological status 
becomes ambiguous. The Big Bang, for example, 
appears to be also a mental construct dealing with 
the alleged past of the universe, but only through 
references to here and now, because its theory is 
constructed upon observations made here and now 
and progressing to the future. Correspondingly, 
for Wheeler, the question of the physical existence 
of the Big Bang has no sense if it is not placed in 
the context of how it is constituted and articulated 
by human observers here and now. He expresses 
this conviction by posing a question: “Is the term 
‘big bang’ merely a shorthand way to describe the 
cumulative consequence of billions upon billions 
of elementary acts of observer-participancy 
reaching back into the past [..] ?” (Wheeler 1994[1], 
p. 128; Cf. Wheeler 1985, p. 387). Elsewhere 
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Wheeler generalises this thought applying it to 
the constructed temporality of the past: “The 
‘past’ is theory. The past has no existence except 
as it is recorded in the present. By detecting what 
questions our quantum registering equipment shall 
put in the present, we have an undeniable choice 
in what we have the right to say about the past” 
(Wheeler 1985, p. 366; 1988, p. 13). 18 The acts of 
observer-participancy intend to reach to the past 
of the universe, whereas their conscious dynamics 
is constantly directed to the future. Certainly, 
according to Wheeler, there is no sense to enquire 
into the “objective” sense of the universe before 
or beyond the intelligence emerged; as expressed 
in a philosophical context by Christos Yannaras, 
“even the formation of the universe “before” the 
appearance of its human cognition does not destroy 
the character of being invited-to-relationship of 
the universe’s referentiality. For the “before” and 
“after” are by-products of the relationship between 
humanity and the world, the only relationship that 
constitutes an existential fact and whatever “pre”-
required evolutionary process is needed for its 
realisation” (Yannaras 2004, p. 138) (Cf. (Wheeler 
1975, p. 17)).
If the Big Bang is constituted in the ongoing 
process of exploration of the universe, the whole 
issue of the initial conditions of the universe as if 
they were once and forever set from the “outside” of 
the universe looses its objectivistic sense, because 
the whole history of the universe is constructed 
by humanity from its present state so that the past 
of the universe is seen only in the perspective of 
the ever moving present and the ultimate point in 
the past, the origin of all, can then be grasped as a 
limiting point of humanity’s knowledge not only 
as a boundary of its present state of understanding 
but as an ideal aspired for through the movement 
of knowledge to the future, that is as it telos. In 
this case the notion of the Big Bang functions 
in human knowledge as a limiting point for any 
historically given state of knowledge, but, at the 
same time this limit as being extended through 
the progress of science becomes the ground of 
its motivation and aspiration explicating not only 
the Big Bang as a remote physical pole, but also 
explicating the evolving epistemology of the 
enquiry in the foundation of the facticity of all, 
including the very enquiring consciousness. Here 
we inevitably come to an interesting and counter-
intuitive conclusion that the Big Bang, as an 
allegedly physical pole in the origin of the visible 
universe, turns out to be the telos of scientific 
explanation, as its ultimate goal to see the origin 
of the varied display in the universe in the unity 
of “all in all”.19 
In practically all papers related to the genesis 
of the World of Existences Wheeler promotes 
an idea of the cosmological singularity or the 
Big Bang which has demonstrated to us that 
all classical laws of physics as well as its basic 
notions disappear at the singularity, so that the 
“ultimate, underlying” reality cannot be described 
in terms of physical laws and categories at all: 
there is a law, that there is no law. Elsewhere the 
situation with the impossibility to ascribing to the 
Big Bang spatio-temporal attributes and at the 
same time the fact that it is the Big-Bang which 
supposed to give “beginning” to space and time 
in their facticity, was qualified as that the Big 
Bang notifies in theory the “existential” fact of 
the uniqueness and concreteness of the universe 
without entailing the materiality of its existence 
(Yannaras 2004, p. 107). Indeed, if the Big Bang, 
according to Wheeler is the construction, that is 
constituted through the relationship between the 
world and humanity, then what is the objectivistic 
and material status of this construction: does the 
phenomenality of the Big Bang falls into the 
category of the physical “out there”? Yannaras 
poses a question in an even more radical form: if 
the Big Bang is the metaphysical concept which 
presupposes an obligatory exit from succession 
of before and after, and also from every 
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dimensional location, does it entail the exist from 
the presupposition of the existent? (Yannaras 
2004, p. 105) Wheeler’s answer is that it does 
not: the Big Bang can be attributed the status of 
the existent but in a strictly constituted sense in 
the same way that he advocates that the laws of 
classical physics are constituted by us. 
It is not difficult to conjecture that the only 
“real” law which drives physics is the “law” that 
the universe must be explicable. It is impossible 
to deny this requirement for explicability even in 
Wheeler’s thought, for, in fact, all his edifice of 
dealing with the genesis of physics is to advocate 
the explicability of the universe whatever 
philosophical orientation taken. In this sense it 
is this explicability which becomes the ultimate 
telos of the whole complex of human observers – 
the universe. The maxim of teleology, if one uses 
Kant’s terminology, ordains in Wheeler’s scheme 
of things the use of some established physical law-
like strategies for giving more precise details of the 
genesis of physical objects.20 There is an implicit 
purposiveness in the closed circuit established 
between observers and physical reality which 
ultimately proceeds from the nature of observers 
as human intelligent beings endowed with the 
purposiveness of any actions. This purposiveness, 
in order to avoid any classical and unfashionable 
teleology related to the physical development of 
the universe, must presuppose an extra-physical 
character. Seen theologically, the purposiveness 
can proceed from the Divine image, set up exactly 
for the purpose of bringing the universe to union 
with God through an integrate knowledge of it 
(Nesteruk 2003, p. 230). If this theological stance 
seems to be unsatisfactory and one becomes 
inclined towards a materialistic reductionism, 
attributing the purposiveness of explanation 
as being implanted in physical reality, then the 
alleged purposiveness of the universe brings us to 
the question of its subject: who is that intentional 
agent for whom the universe has a purpose? It 
is not difficult to see that the idea of the Divine 
subjectivity enters the scheme of things at a 
different level: the Participatory AP in this case 
becomes similar to that version of the Strong AP 
which postulates that the universe must have 
human agencies as its product at a certain stage of 
its development. If this is true, then the difference 
between the Participatory AP and the Strong AP, 
which was so emphatically advocated by Wheeler 
become blurred. Our analysis thus unfolds the 
most important and metaphysical point to be 
made on Wheeler’s ideas, namely the mystery 
and precarious status of human agents, observers-
participants in what concerns the origin of their 
purposive actions which are in the foundation of 
knowledge of the universe. It seems that Wheeler’s 
hope that human intelligence and correspondingly 
purposiveness as such will eventually become a 
subject of explanation by physics remains in vain, 
for the basic question of the facticity of the human 
intelligent agency, in spite of all reductionist 
hopes, remains unanswered. Purposiveness is a 
human aspect of existence and one can hardly 
believe that physics, being purposive activity, 
can explain the emergence of this purposiveness 
out of itself. What is important, however, is that 
the existence of life and intelligence, being an 
“experiential fact” and determining the lines 
of scientific enquiry provides “the unlimited 
informative value for the universe and its laws” 
(Yannaras 2004, p. 117). 
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Appendix 1: Humanity as the centre of disclosure and manifestation of the universe
1 This paradox is a p rennial problem of philosophy and was anticipated by ancient Greek philosophe s and Christian 
thinkers. It was expressed differently by such philosophers as Kant (see, for example, Kant’s conclusion to his Critique 
of Practical Reason.) Among phenomenological philosophers who dealt with this paradox one can mention E. Husserl, 
M. Scheler, M. Merleau-Ponty, E. Fromm and others. The general discussion of this paradox can be found in (Carr, 1999). 
The role of this paradox in discussions on science and theology can be found in (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 173-75). Applied to 
the study of the universe the paradox of human subjectivity can be formulated as follows: on the one hand human beings 
in the facticity of their embodied condition form the centre of disclosure and manifestation of the universe as a whole, 
modelling it as overall-space and time which exceeds the limits of the attuned space related to humanity’s comportment 
on the planet earth (the home place). On the other hand the depicted universe as a vast continuum of space and time posi-
tions humanity in an insignificant place in the whole totality making its existence not only contingent (in physical terms) 
but full of nonsense from the point of view of the actually infinite universe. Said bluntly the actual infinity of the universe 
is attempted to be articulated from an infinitely small part of its formation. One could express this differ ntly: through 
its insight humanity is co-present in all points of what it observes in the universe, or imagines, while physically being 
restricted to an insignificant part of it. 
2 Certainly such a questioning on the place of humanity in the universe is not novel in history of thought and philosophy. 
It is enough to point to Pascal, who compared human being with the “thinking reed” whose position in the universe is 
ambivalent because of the physical insignificance and epistemological centrality: “Man is a reed, the feeblest in nature; 
but he is a thinking reed. The whole universe need not take up arm  to crush him…But even if the universe should crush 
him, man would still be more noble than that which kills him, since he knows he is mortal, and knows that the universe is 
more powerful that he: but the universe itself knows nothing of it” (Pascal 1959, p. 78).
3 See in this respect (Weyl 1994).
4 One of such prophecies was promoted by F. Tipler in his book (Tipler 1995) where he develops an idea of such a large-scale 
affection of the universe which will guarantee the possibility of an indefinite information processing, which, according to 
Tipler mimics the persistence of life in the universe. 
5 Wheeler’s appeal is in a way similar to a phenomenological assertion that without taking into account the generating 
power of human subjectivity, the efficacy of the sciences, either human or natural, remains obscured; see e.g. (Gurwitsch 
1966, pp. 399-400).
6 Existentialists considered the fact of life as a primary data for any further philosophising, the fact which as such cannot be 
placed in any allegedly wider and more general framework of the world’s necessities. The radical metaphysical mystery of 
existence is expressed in human inability to “look” at this existence from outside. 
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7 See on temporality and mathematics (Davis, Hersch, Descartes’s Dream, 1990, pp. 189-201). 
8 This expression, used by (Gurwitsch 1974, p. 44) did not mean “hypostasis” in a theological sense. Elements of nature as 
“mental creation” also appeared in the terminology of Einstein. See, for example, (Einstein 1973, p. 291). 
9 See a careful explanation of the meaning of this term in (Nesteruk 2003, pp. 112-17; 2004).
10 It was his last book, The Crisis of European Sciences (Husserl 1970), where Husserl undertook a critique of the 
mathematisation of nature whose inception was associated with the name of Galileo. The topic was later discussed and 
developed in numerous papers. See, for example, (Gurwitsch 1967), (Kvasz 2002).
11 This is a short formulation of the Participatory Anthropic Principle. See (Barrow, Tipler, 1986, p. 22).
12 Wheeler argues that his approach to understanding the place and role of man in the universe contrasts to the selection 
mechanism of the many worlds (MW) version of the Strong AP (which assumes pre-existence not only of the visible 
universe, but also the multitude of other universes) in a sense, that the Participatory AP is “founded on construction” 
(Wheeler 1987, p. 310). He articulates this contrast as an opposition in views on the place of man in the universe as medio-
cre versus central: “Life, mind, and meaning have only a peripheral and accidental place in the scheme of things in this 
view [i.e. MW-Strong AP (A.N.)]. In the other view [that is, Participatory AP (A.N.)] they are central. Only by their agency 
is it even possible to construct the universe or existence, or what we call reality. Those make-believe universes totally 
devoid of life are (according to this view) totally devoid of physical sense not merely because they cannot be observed, but 
because there is no way to make them” (Ibid.).
13 The place of observer is not to “create out of nothing” in a theological sense, but to act an ancient god-demiurge who orders 
the universe from preexistent matter.
14 The metaphor of ‘flesh’ is borrowed from M. Merleau-Ponty. 
15 Margenau anticipated that many scientists would disagree with such an attitude because they maintain a faith in the con-
vergence of the system of the entire set of physical explanations which would deliver them an ideal of their aspirations, that 
is a unique and ultimate set of constructs for which would reserve the name ‘reality’. However he points out that this belief 
in convergence in question is problematic because it is not capable of scientific proof. ((Ibid). See also (Margenau 1977, 
p. 76) The situation in modern cosmology, where the ever increasing set of theoretical constructs reveals the components 
of the matter content of the universe which escape physical description points exactly to the danger of idealisation of the 
scientific description of the universe: the more details we know the less we understand the entirety. 
16 The concept of the life world was introduced in Husserl’s Crisis (Husserl 1974) and was a matter of vast discussion by 
phenomenological philosophers. See for a recent review (Steinbock 1995).
17 The fundamental problematic character of any philosophical enquiry into the nature of human consciousness is expressed 
in modern terms through a concept of the so called “negative certitude” meaning that the facticity of consciousness can 
only be approached with certainty in negative terms, that it is certain that its mystery can only be predicated in terms of 
that which is not this consciousness (see (Marion 2010, pp. 21-86)). 
18 This thought must be placed into an even more general conviction that in the ultimate scheme of things there is no time or 
temporality at all. Temporality is a human construction: “The word Time came, not from heaven, but from the mouth of man, 
an early thinker, his name long lost. If problems attend the term, they are of our own making” (Wheeler 1994[2], p. 6). 
19 This point was developed in (Nesteruk 2008, 2012 [1] ).
20 See more details on this issue in (Nesteruk 2012 [3] ).
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«Соучаствующая вселенная» Дж. А. Уилера  
как интенциональный коррелят  
воплощенных субъектов и как экспликация  
целесообразности в физике 
А.В. Нестерук
Университет Портсмута
Лайон Гэйт Бюлдинг,
ПОРТСМУТ, РО1 3НF, Великобритания
В этой статье мы продолжаем исследовать роль субъекта и ограничений, связанных с его 
познавательными способностями, в артикуляции вселенной в физике и космологии. В качестве 
примера рассматривается комплекс идей о так называемой соучаствующей вселенной, 
выдвинутых поздним Дж. А. Уилером. Целью статьи является экспликация роли человеческого 
наблюдателя как центра, из которого paскрывается и манифестируется вселенная, а также 
телеологии, присущей научному представлению о вселенной, проистекающей из внутренней 
целесообразности человеческой деятельности. 
Ключевые слова: вселенная, соучастие, субъект, наблюдатель, существование, 
целесообразность.
